

Dm 3 Oct  
Pls call <sup>Tort</sup> Tom Throw

INR / State Com code,

Xt. 2019) for me

for discussion per <sup>my</sup> ~~out~~

discussion in stop meeting -

You might want to review

my journal item 730

Sept evening Thro's just

call. - Be helpful to him,

will be in the process,

check with GLL a one on

your <sup>recognition</sup> ~~recognition~~ to him.

Don't state an Agency position before  
it could be so interpreted before  
checkers. Mr

What is time situation?



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0974.1697

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Legislative Counsel

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

23 September 1974

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

General Counsel

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

9/23/74 9/26/74 JDM

2.

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4.

OLC

5.

6.

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8.

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11.

12.

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14.

15.

We have been asked for comments on S. Res 404. Please review and let us know if you have any comments.

Assistant Legislative Counsel

1-4  
while there may be quite a few things we would say about this to our own committees will not refrain from official comment or give the usual "what ever Congress wants" is O.K. with us

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FORM  
3-62610 USE PREVIOUS  
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JOHN STENNIS  
STUART SYKINGTON, MO.  
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.  
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HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.  
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, N.H.  
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., VA.  
HAROLD E. HUGHES, IOWA  
SAM NUNN GA.

STROM THURMOND, S.C.  
JOHN TOWER, TEX.  
PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA.  
ROBERT TAFT, JR., OHIO

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Executive Registry

174-4891

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

174-2066

September 18, 1974

Honorable William E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Director:

Enclosed herewith is a copy of S. Res. 404  
now pending before this committee, which is referred to  
you for consideration.

It will be appreciated if you will submit to this  
committee 4 copies of the recommendations of your  
Department with reference to this legislation.

Sincerely,

*John C. Stennis.*

Enclosure

93<sup>D</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

## S. RES. 404

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 17, 1974

Mr. MONDALE submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the  
Committee on Armed Services

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## RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee of the Senate on intelligence  
policy.

Whereas revelations concerning the role of foreign intelligence  
operations of the United States Government in undermining  
the stability of democratically elected governments have  
raised serious questions concerning the management, policies,  
and purposes of United States intelligence operations and  
their compatibility with the authority of the Congress and  
the values of the American people: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved, That—*

2       SECTION 1. There is hereby established a select com-

3       mittee of the Senate, which may be called, for convenience

4       of expression, the Select Committee on Intelligence Policy.

1        SEC. 2. The select committee created by this resolu-  
2        tion shall consist of fifteen Members of the Senate, composed  
3        of three majority and two minority members of the Com-  
4        mittee on Armed Services, three majority and two minority  
5        members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and three  
6        majority and two minority Members of the Senate, to be  
7        selected in the same manner as the chairman and members  
8        of the standing committees of the Senate. For the purposes  
9        of paragraph 6 rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Sen-  
10       ate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice  
11       chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into  
12       account.

13       SEC. 3. The select committee is authorized and directed  
14       to examine past, present, and projected intelligence opera-  
15       tions and policies of the United States Government, and to  
16       determine the role of such operations in supporting the deci-  
17       sionmaking of the United States Government, and the im-  
18       pact of such operations on national security and the conduct  
19       of foreign policy. The select committee shall make an interim  
20       report to the appropriate committee of the Senate not later  
21       than June 30, 1975, and shall make a final report not later  
22       than January 31, 197<sup>6</sup>~~4~~. Such final report shall contain the  
23       findings of the committee together with recommendations  
24       respecting the management of intelligence operations within

3

1 appropriate function of varying types of intelligence activi-  
2 ties, and recommendations requesting any appropriate legis-  
3 lative action.

4 SEC. 4. To enable the select committee to make the  
5 investigation and study authorized and directed by this  
6 resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select com-  
7 mittee as an agency of the Senate to employ and fix the  
8 compensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, techni-  
9 cal, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appro-  
10 priate; to sit and act at any time or place during sessions,  
11 recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; to hold  
12 hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu-  
13 mentary or physical evidence (including classified in-  
14 formation respecting clandestine operations, which shall  
15 be made available to the select committee and senior  
16 staff designated by the select committee) relating to the  
17 matters it is authorized to investigate and study; and to  
18 expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate  
19 any money made available to it by the Senate to perform  
20 the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this  
21 resolution and to make the investigation and study it is  
22 authorized by this resolution to make.

23 SEC. 5. The expenses of the select committee under this

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25 penses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate

4

1. upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the select com-
2. mittee.

93d CONGRESS  
2d Session

**S. RES. 404**

## **RESOLUTION**

To establish a select committee of the Senate on  
intelligence policy.

By Mr. MONDALE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1974

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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25 October 1974

To: LLM

Here's the redo of our comments on the Mondale resolution. I hope this satisfactorily incorporates the points you made. I left the first paragraph as two sentences because I feel it is too much of a mouthful for one sentence.

DFM

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DRAFT:DFM:cg (25 Oct 74)

Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for our comments on  
S. Res. 404, establishing a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Policy. The Select Committee would be empowered to examine intelligence  
operations and policies of the United States Government, determine the  
role of such activities in the decision-making process, and measure the  
impact of intelligence operations on national security and foreign policy.

*On the manner in which*  
As you know, I have consistently taken the position that the question  
of how the Congress exercises oversight of <sup>is even for this Agency</sup> CIA is a matter for the Congress  
to decide. ~~Consistent with this policy, I also prefer to refrain from~~  
*and for that reason I have no*  
commenting on the merits of a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
*or establish the proposal* Policy. *I am confident*  
~~The any Amendment and change in oversight~~  
Policy. If the Senate believes the national interest would be advanced and  
votes to establish such a Committee, then of course this Agency will do all  
it can to cooperate fully with it. *that Congress in providing Access to*  
*our sensitive*

Pursuant to Congressionally-established procedures, the Central  
Intelligence Agency regularly reports highly classified national security  
information to its oversight committees in the Congress. These committees

*that the Senate is*

*Agency in providing what the do in steps - one review &*  
*Assure that*  
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*for such direction as is a very confidential one?*

have an excellent record of maintaining the secrecy of this information.

I am confident that a Senate Select Committee would also take particular care to insure that the secrecy of its information is protected.

*It is*  
I note that the proposed field of inquiry of the Senate Select Committee is almost identical to one of the major areas currently being studied by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, *which was created by PL \_\_\_\_\_*. The Commission's findings are to be reported to the Congress and to the President by June 30, 1975, which is also the deadline for an interim report by the proposed Select Committee. ~~The twelve-member Commission has strong Congressional representation, including~~ Senator James B. Pearson, *who* ~~serves as vice-chairman~~ *the Commission* Senator Mike Mansfield, and Representatives Clement J. Zablocki and Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen. *an*

The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby  
Director

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10/18/74

LLM: This is the second round for this letter.

It's been revised in line with George's suggestions.

DFM

*Clara - please redo in draft.*

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DRAFT:DFM:cg (18 Oct 74)

Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for our comments on S. Res. 404, ~~which would establish a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Policy.~~ <sup>leave in</sup> ~~The Select Committee would be empowered to examine intelligence operations and policies of the United States Government, to determine the role of such activities in the decision-making process, and to measure the impact of intelligence operations on national security and foreign policy.~~

As you know, I have consistently taken the position that the question of how the Congress exercises oversight of CIA is a matter for the Congress to decide. Consistent with this policy, I also prefer to refrain from commenting on the merits of a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Policy. If the Senate believes the national interest would be advanced and votes to establish such a Committee, then of course this Agency will do all it can to cooperate fully with it. ~~In light of recent unauthorized leaks of~~

~~highly classified national security information, we would only ask that the Senate take particular care to insure that the secrecy of the Committee's material is protected.~~

~~In determining whether a Select Committee on Intelligence Policy is warranted, the Senate may want to take note of the work and progress~~

of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct  
of Foreign Policy. *get the 12 new commi 4 are for the*  
This Commission was established in P. L. 92-352,

*expressed*  
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Two United States  
Senators, *Mr. J. B. Pearson* and Mr. Mike Mansfield, and two  
*and expressed*  
members of the House of Representatives, Mr. Peter Frelinghuysen and  
*Mr. C.*  
Mr. Clement Zablocki, are members of this twelve member Commission.

One major area of the Commission's study, the intelligence community  
and the proper role and scope of intelligence activities in the United States  
Government, is quite similar to the field of inquiry of the proposed Senate  
Select Committee. I understand the Commission will specifically address  
the issue of covert action. A report of the Commission's findings is  
scheduled to be submitted to the Congress and to the President by

*is at* June 30, 1975, *but have not yet finished before the time that*

*fixed*  
*para.*  
*5.*  
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection  
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's  
program.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby  
Director

GLC:

Attached is a draft on the Mondale  
proposal for a Senate Select Committee on  
Intelligence Policy.

DFM

Dan  
Pls develop para 2  
a little more along  
the lines of my  
scribbles + DCI's prior  
letter to Congress  
JH

DRAFT:DFM:bao (9 Oct 74)

Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for our comments on S. Res. 404,  
which would establish a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Policy.

The Select Committee would be empowered to examine intelligence operations  
and policies of the United States Government, to determine the role of such  
activities in the decision-making process, and to measure the impact of

intelligence operations on national security and foreign policy.

*As you know I have consistently taken the position*  
*I would have*  
The Central Intelligence Agency has no objection to the formation  
of a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Policy. If the Senate believes

the national interest would be advanced and votes to establish such a  
Committee, then of course this Agency will do all it can to cooperate fully  
with the Committee. In light of recent unauthorized leaks of highly classified  
national security information, we would only ask that the Senate take  
particular care to insure that the secrecy of the Committee's material is  
protected.

ILLEGIB  
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In determining whether a Select Committee on Intelligence  
Policy is warranted, the Senate may want to take note of the work and  
progress of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct  
of Foreign Policy. This Commission was established in P. L. 92-352,

ILLEGIB

the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. Two United States Senators, Mr. James B. Pearson and Mr. Mike Mansfield, and two members of the House of Representatives, Mr. Peter Frelinghuysen and Mr. Clement Zablocki, are members of this twelve member Commission. One major area of the Commission's study, the intelligence community and the proper role and scope of intelligence activities in the United States Government, is quite similar to the field of inquiry of the proposed Senate Select Committee. I understand the Commission will specifically address the issue of covert action. A report of the Commission's findings is scheduled to be submitted to the Congress and to the President by June 30, 1975.

The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby  
Director



2025 M STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

## MANDATE

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352, July 13, 1972) established a joint Presidential-Congressional study commission to submit to the Congress and the President findings and recommendations "to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy."

In describing the duties of the Commission the law states that "the Commission shall study and investigate the organization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the United States Government participating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy." In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission may make recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the departments and agencies, more effective arrangements between executive branch and Congress, improved procedures among departments and agencies, the abolition of services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy, and "other measures to promote peace, economy, efficiency and improved administration of foreign policy."

The report of the Commission, which is to be submitted to the President and the Congress by June 30, 1975, may include "proposed constitutional amendments, legislation, and administrative action considered appropriate in carrying out its duties." The Commission, in performing its responsibilities, is authorized to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and secure directly information from any executive department or agency.

## COMMISSION MEMBERS

The Commission is composed of twelve members, four each appointed by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the President. The members are:

THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY - Chairman  
Corning Glass International  
New York, New York

THE HONORABLE JAMES B. PEARSON - Vice Chairman  
United States Senate

Chairman, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Priorities  
Georgetown University

MRS. ANNE ARMSTRONG  
Counsellor to the President  
White House

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs  
Department of State

MRS. CHARLES W. ENGLEHARD, JR.  
Far Hills, New Jersey

MR. AREND D. LUBBERS  
President, Grand Valley State College  
Allendale, Michigan

MR. FRANK C. P. McGLINN  
Executive Vice President  
Fidelity Bank  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD  
House of Representatives

THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD  
United States Senate

DR. STANLEY P. WAGNER  
President, East Central State College  
Ada, Oklahoma

THE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI  
House of Representatives

COMMISSION STAFF

FRANCIS O. WILCOX is the Executive Director of the Commission and FISHER HOWE is the Deputy Executive Director. Former Senator WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., is General Counsel to the Commission. The Commission offices are located at 2025 M Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20506. Telephone (202) 254-9850.

June 1, 1973  
COG/FP STAFF 1

COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT  
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 8, 1974

The Honorable William E. Colby  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

As the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy moves from the briefing phase to the phase of study in depth of some selected features, I would like to outline for you our approach in the area of intelligence. Intelligence obviously plays a major role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. We would like to identify that role clearly and look at various ways intelligence could make an even better contribution to foreign policy deliberations. This will require us to be aware of some of the organizational aspects of the intelligence relationship to foreign policy and to assess the ways in which intelligence contributes to foreign policy, from the raw report to the finished estimate. We must also cover the degree of success our intelligence has and can hope to have in accurately reporting events abroad and projecting their likely future directions. I think we must include a review of the political costs involved in intelligence operations where they do cause problems for foreign policy. As a related but somewhat separable issue, we will need to identify the role in our foreign policy of what is called covert action and come to some judgments on its desirability, extent and decision-making process.

On the other hand, I do not view the Commission's function as reviewing and making recommendations on the organization of our intelligence services and community, its budgets, personnel strengths, etc., or the details of its operations and procedures. The Commission will not be conducting an investigation of the organization of intelligence itself, but, rather, the role of intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign policy. In order to make informed judgments on the latter, of course, we must be aware of some of these matters as necessary background, but I want to assure you that the thrust of our work will be in the latter category. I share what I know is your great concern about the necessity to protect the sensitive operational aspects of the intelligence effort. We will conduct our inquiry and maintain our records so as not to expose such matters.

As you know, we have consulted a number of experts to help the Commission draw up a Study Plan, and I enclose a copy of their suggestions for your information. The plan would operate under the close supervision of our Executive Director Francis Wilcox and his Deputy Fisher Howe. It will be

The Honorable William E. Colby

Page 2

will  
noted that Mr. William J. Barnds/draw up Paper #1 and #2 on "Intelligence Functions and Policy Making in the Institutional Context"; Mr. Clinton W. Kelly III, Paper #3 on "Innovation in Intelligence Production", and William R. Harris, Paper #4, on "Authority for the Conduct and Management of Foreign Intelligence".

As you will note from the enclosure, there will be an "all source" study project under Intelligence Project Director Mr. Kent Crane, which will include analysis of past studies and reports on the intelligence community. He and others will be discussing with you the specifics of these studies and be sure that appropriate clearances are obtained and other arrangements made.

The Commission is most grateful for your cooperation and encouragement in the initial phase of our work.

With warm regards

Yours sincerely,

*Robert Murphy*  
Robert Murphy  
Chairman

RM:lb  
Enclosures

July 19, 1974

SUBJECT: Study Plan - Intelligence and Covert Action

1. The Problem.

- (a) What organizational and procedural steps should be taken to improve intelligence support for the conduct of foreign affairs, and what level of effort is required to provide adequate support?
- (b) Should the U.S. have a capability for covert political action; if so, where should the responsibility be lodged and under what controls should it operate?

Some important intelligence matters, including especially an examination of the usefulness of intelligence support in a variety of foreign policy situations, will be addressed in the case studies of the Commission's Research Plan. But many aspects of the organization and procedures of the intelligence community also deserve separate and reasonably comprehensive study. The agencies are large, costly, and important to the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore, there is disagreement about the roles they should play in the post-cold war era. Some of the issues involved have not been thoroughly examined by previous commissions.

The problem of intelligence generally breaks down into the following components:

- (a) The Role of Intelligence. What is the proper function performed by intelligence in support of the conduct of foreign policy; what should it do and what should it not do? Involved here is an analysis of the manner in which intelligence can give support to a wide variety of customers. It also calls for a review of misunderstandings and different perspectives that distort the relationship between intelligence users and intelligence producers and collectors.
- (b) The Activities Appropriate to that Role.
  - 1. In the process of analysis to produce "finished" intelligence, what are the roles best played by the State Department (INR),

DIA, other Agencies, and the various analytical offices in CIA. What should be the system for producing National Intelligence Estimates?

2. What is the best organization for the collection of raw information in support of intelligence analysis and of policymakers who set priorities, allocate missions, and control collectors overseas; how much collection is related to foreign policy as opposed to other purposes; what are the strengths and weaknesses of collection by Foreign Service Officers, CIA stations, military attaches, and technical sensors; what is the procedure of disseminating raw data; what are the mechanisms for insuring feedback to the collectors?

- (c) The Role of the Director of Central Intelligence. What is the most desirable relationship of the DCI to the President and the National Security Council; what should be the extent of his authority over the full range of intelligence programs, military as well as civilian.

In addition to the foregoing aspects of the intelligence function, the problem of covert political action, including its sensitive relationship to clandestine intelligence collection, must be closely examined.

The Commission's exploration of the problems of intelligence and of covert action in relation to the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy is made particularly difficult by (a) the size and complexity of the intelligence community, (b) the intricacy of the relationship between the several components of the intelligence effort and policymaking, but particularly (c) the highly classified nature of the intelligence function and materials. For these reasons, a special and quite different study plan must be developed.

## 2. Study Plan.

A Study Group composed of two or three Commission members and a number of experts knowledgeable about intelligence matters, drawn from several different quarters, will prepare conclusions and recommendations for the Commission's review. The group will be equipped to deal with classified information.

September 23, 1974

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Subcommittee/Study Group on Intelligence and Covert Action

An outline of proposed activity for the Intelligence Subcommittee, as expanded into a Study Group, is set forth as follows:

1. The Key Substantive Issues

The basic issues for consideration by the Subcommittee/Study Group presented in Enclosure A.

2. Relevant Material Available to the Subcommittee/Study Group

- (a) Major Institutional Report: A letter (12 pages) from DCI Colby to Chairman Murphy outlining formal procedures and organization throughout the intelligence community.
- (b) Major Institutional Hearings (19-20 November 1973): Testimony of DCI Colby; Ray Cline and William Porter from the State Department; and Dr. Hall and Admiral de Poix from the Defense Department. (Summaries of 7-9 pages are available for each one.) The CIA and State testimony is more thoughtful and less rigid than the Defense testimony, but few organizational and procedural changes are recommended by any of them.
- (c) Research Program Case Studies: Some important intelligence matters, including especially an examination of the usefulness of intelligence support in a variety of specific foreign policy situations, will be addressed in the case studies of the Commission's Research Plan.
- (d) Analytical Studies: A set of intelligence analytical issue papers is being prepared under the direction of Dr. William Harris. The papers, between 25 and 75 pages, will be a critically important contribution to the Subcommittee/Study Group deliberations.

Subj: Subcommittee/Study Group on Intelligence and Covert Action

They will be available in late October and will cover the following topics:

1. An overview of intelligence functions;
2. Intelligence and policy-making in the institutional context;
3. Innovation in intelligence production;
4. The authority for foreign intelligence;
5. Intelligence resource management; and
6. Covert action.

(e) An All-Source Study: An all-source study project is being mounted by J. J. Hitchcock, under the direction of Kent Crane, to analyze past studies and reports on the intelligence community. This limited-access report, of between 30 and 50 pages, will be available in late October.

(f) Recommended Reading: Enclosure B is a short bibliography of particularly useful books and articles.

### 3. Suggested Plan of Subcommittee/Study Group Action

A total of perhaps five or six 2-day meetings spread over a period of four months will probably be required to review the materials and prepare findings and recommendations:

- (a) A meeting in conjunction with the October Commission meeting to review the key substantive issues in Enclosure A and the outlines for the Analytical Studies (2d above) and "All Source Study" (2e above).
- (b) Second and third meetings in November primarily to discuss with the authors the papers developed in the "Analytical Studies (2d above) and the "All Source Study" (2e above).
- (c) Fourth and fifth meetings in December and early January for the preparation of findings and recommendations.
- (d) A final meeting in January to discuss and revise as necessary a Subcommittee/Study Group report to the Commission.



ENCLOSURE A

The Key Substantive Issues

a. General

What is the proper function performed by intelligence in support of the conduct of foreign policy?

b. Intelligence Analysis

- (1) How can the relationship between the producers and consumers of finished intelligence be improved?
- (2) In the process of analysis to produce finished intelligence, what are the roles best played by the State Department (INR), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the various analytical offices in the CIA?
- (3) What should be the system for producing National Intelligence Estimates?
- (4) What new forecasting and scoring techniques should be applied to intelligence analysis?

c. Collection of Information for Foreign Policy Support

- (1) What is the best organization for the collection of raw information of use to the foreign policy community - either directly or in support of intelligence analysis? What is the best procedure for setting priorities, allocating missions, and controlling collectors overseas?
- (2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of collection by Foreign Service Officers, CIA Stations, military attaches, and technical sensors?
- (3) How can intelligence resources be of greater assistance in new fields and in support of new potential customers?

Director of Central Intelligence to the President and National Security Council? What should be the extent of his authority over the full range of intelligence programs, military as well as civilian?

- (2) What changes, if any, are called for in the statutory base and general authorities for foreign intelligence?

e. Resource Management

- (1) Since the overwhelming share of the combined intelligence budget is expended by DoD agencies, with practical constraints upon intervention by the DCI or his Intelligence Community Staff, what are the implications for the reorganization of DoD intelligence management?
- (2) If there are systematic misallocations of resources, what organizational or legislative reforms are advisable?

f. Covert Action

- (1) What are the pros and cons of maintaining a capability for covert action, and what criteria ought to govern its use?
- (2) Where should the responsibility for covert action be lodged, and under what controls should it operate?

g. Congressional Oversight

What kind of Congressional oversight should be applied to intelligence activities and to covert political action?(NOTE: THIS SUBJECT WILL BE REVISED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE IN SUBCOMMITTEE I AS A FUNCTION OF THE LARGER SUBJECT OF CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE RELATIONS.)

ENCLOSURE B

Recommended Reading

- (a) The Intelligence Establishment, by Harry Howe Ransom, Cambridge, 1970. The most thorough and best balanced treatment of the intelligence community by any academic (254 pages).
- (b) The U.S. Intelligence Community, by Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., New York, 1973. The view from the inside by one of the old timers in the intelligence business. A somewhat shallow, but quite reliable, survey (191 pages).
- (c) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Marchetti and Marks, 1974. A comprehensive and current discussion of the issues, albeit highly one-sided and biased. The authors admit the utility of intelligence analysis in principle but come out strongly against covert operations (337 pages).
- (d) "The CIA and Decision Making" article by Chester Cooper in Foreign Affairs, 1972. A provocative paper on the problems of estimating and the relationship between intelligence and policy-makers (13 pages).
- (e) "Intelligence and Foreign Policy, Dilemmas of a Democracy," article by William Barnds in Foreign Affairs, January 1969. A wide-ranging paper on intelligence activities, covert action, and public attitudes (17 pages).
- (f) "Intelligence and Covert Operations: Changing Doctrine and Practice," unpublished article by Paul Blackstock based on a questionnaire circulated among former intelligence officials. It raises many of the basic issues and offers a multitude of differing opinions (126 pages).

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Monday - 30 September 1974

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25X1 14. [ ] After making a last minute check with Ted Shackley, C/EA, who said a similar approach was being made to the Assistant Secretary of State and the State desk, called Stan Anderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Congressional Relations, Department of State, and requested that they advise Ambassador Bruce of the Agency's interest in meeting with him prior to any appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said that they would pass this message on if they had an opportunity to do so.

25X1 15. [ ] John Thro, INR, called to consult on possible views on S. Res. 404, to establish a select committee of the Senate on intelligence policy, in connection with views INR is drawing together for consideration by the Secretary of State. I reviewed our standard position of deferring to the Congress on the method and structure of oversight as long as adequate measures are taken to protect sensitive information. I mentioned that the requirement for reporting on covert action to oversight committees as required by pending bills in the Congress, has been supported by the Administration and Mr. Colby, and that the situation was quite fluid because of the current controversy. I also mentioned the other resolutions on this subject, including the one just introduced by Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D., Wis.). It was agreed that I would be back in touch with some positive recommendations soon.

25X1 16. [ ] Pam Taylor, on the staff of Representative C.W. "Bill" Young (R., Fla.), called to ask for information about the 40 Committee. I referred her to the 23 September Newsweek article. She said that would satisfy her needs very well.

25X1 25X1A 17. [ ] Received a call from Grace Scott, Senator William L. Scott's (R., Va.) office, requesting an employment interview for [ ] After checking with [ ] I arranged for [ ] to be seen at 1430 hours this afternoon.